State Aid in the Visegrad Countries: Similarities and Differences by Potvorszki, Gábor
'Club of Economics in Miskolc' TMP Vol.14., Nr. 2., pp. 57-70. 2018.   http://dx.doi.org/10.18096/TMP.2018.02.05 
 57 
State Aid in the Visegrad Countries: 
Similarities and Differences 
GÁBOR POTVORSZKI, Ph.D. 
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR 
UNIVERSITY OF MISKOLC 
e-mail: regpot@uni-miskolc.hu 
SUMMARY 
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INTRODUCTION 
"State aid is defined as an advantage in any form 
whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings 
by national public authorities. Therefore, subsidies 
granted to individuals or general measures open to all 
enterprises are not covered by this prohibition and do not 
constitute State aid (examples include general taxation 
measures or employment legislation." (European 
Commission) The economics of State aid can be regarded 
as a little researched field until now. The main reasons for 
this can be that most of the empirical studies are related to 
examining whether a (significant) impact can be attributed 
to public money spent, irrespective of its "origin" (e.g. EU 
funds versus national budgetary sources),  but not 
explicitly focusing on State aid. Because of the fact that 
competition law is a specific area of the European Union 
(hereinafter EU), limited to it and applicable to market 
players active in the internal market, and therefore can be 
considered unique in the world. 
LITERATURE REVIEW – CONCEPTS 
OF STATE INTERVENTION 
Nearly all of the main economic theories and schools 
deal with the issue of State intervention and the efficiency 
of public spending and its (possible) impacts, from Adam 
Smith (1776) through Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1962) 
to Krugman (1991; 1994). The basic question to answer is 
whether there is a need to intervene in the economy, and if 
so, to what extent? The theories are quite shared varied 
about it.   
According to 17th-century mercantilism the State had 
to take an active role in theeconomy by promoting export 
growth and protecting the interests of the domestic 
industry. In contrast, the physiocrats emphasized the 
support of agriculture. Adam Smith argued that that market 
forces – influencing supply and demand – will equilibrate 
where products and goods are exchanged at a natural price, 
in which the State should not intervene or only to a limited 
extent. Parallel to the classical theorists, Marshall (1890) 
and Walras (1872) basically rejected the possibility of 
State intervention. In perfectly competitive markets 
demand and supply equilibrate due to market mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, they did not examine the issue of market 
shortage and/or failure.  
Keynes (1936) was the first who comprehensively 
dealt with the necessity for State intervention and 
interpreted its role in the economy in a broader context 
following the global economic and financial crisis between 
1929 and 1932. He argued that in times of crisis there is a 
need to induce demand artificially and indirectly: he 
thought that it could be realized through promoting 
investments in infrastructure and creating jobs, assuming 
that it would generate income in the economy by 
consumption and/or savings and raise the revenues of the 
State budget, too. In contrast to fiscal intervention, 
Friedman (1962) emphasized the role of money supply and 
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its volume in circulation on the economy. He rejected the 
economic role of fiscal policy instruments in essence: the 
State shall not intervene in promoting economic growth 
through the central budget. Moreover, (federal) 
government spending seems to make the economy less 
stable. In the 1970s, after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods gold standard system, the liberal school became 
more dominant again. The neoliberals are on the side of 
deregulation and say that State intervention should be 
limited to the minimum necessary level, its role in the 
economy shall be reduced and the (not yet liberalised) 
industries should be opened to the market. Besides 
ensuring economic liberalism (free market and 
competition), State intervention shall be confined to 
monetary policy instruments (e.g. by floating exchange 
rates). 
One of the main focus points of contemporary 
economic literature and research is the issue of economic 
growth and its driving forces and the role of State in it. The 
alternative economic theory reconsiders the fundamental 
economic dogmas but in a very different way because their 
essence lies in the different approach and handling of 
economic issues (see e.g. heterodox, evolutionist, 
institutionalist and experimental economic schools and 
models based on the blue, green, free or rainbow 
economy). 
In summary, the opinions on the role of State 
intervention are heterogeneous, even in the view of 
contemporary economists who think quite differently 
about it. For instance, see Kornai (1982) on the role of the 
State in public administration and the private sector, which 
is in in full contrast with Piketty (2013) on the role of 
capital in the 21st century as regards income inequality. 
THE VERY SPECIFIC LEGAL 
NATURE OF STATE AID 
The competition policy is a common policy meaning 
that national sovereignty is limited. To understand how the 
competition policy works in practice, its fundaments were 
already laid down in the founding Treaty (namely the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957) in order to ensure fair market 
terms across the EU Member States (hereinafter MSs) and 
to prevent them from turning towards protectionism by 
protecting their markets, which could basically have 
undermined the creation of a common and, afterwards, a 
single and internal market, at the same time. The general 
rules are unchanged since then. State aid is a special area 
of the EU Competition Law. While the main task of 
competition law is basically to create and maintain fair 
market conditions focusing on the regulation of price 
agreements (cartels), prohibit the abuse of dominance of 
market power and unfair market behaviour at the same 
time. In the context of State aid it has the task to control 
when a State intervenes in the economy. Irrespective of the 
form of intervention (directly e.g. through cash grants or 
indirectly e.g. through the tax system or by regulations) 
and ownership issues it has to be ensured that the internal 
market shall not be distorted or threatened and the trade 
between MSs shall also not be affected as a basic principle.  
 
Table 1 
Summary on the concepts of State intervention according to the main economic theories 
Economic 
theory 
Need for State intervention Role of State in the economy 
Mercantilism - to protect domestic industry 
- to promote export Active 
Physiocratism - to support agriculture against industry 
Classical  - to act as a night-watchman 
- to let the invisible hand work ("laissez faire") 
 
 
Passive 
Neoclassical - to equilibrate in perfectly competitive markets (D 
= S) 
Keynesian  - to emphasize the imperfect nature of market 
mechanisms 
- to use fiscal policy 
 
Active 
Monetary - to regulate the money supply 
Neoliberal - to deregule State interventions  
- to improve efficiency  
- to manage market failures, shortages 
 
Passive 
Alternative 
(heterodox) 
- to rethink the role of the State 
- to use non-orthodox instruments contrary to the 
mainstream theories 
 
Active/passive 
Source: author’s compilation 
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State aid is a kind of state intervention but not vice 
versa: only some (state) sources some that are allocated to 
economic players during redistribution qualify as State aid. 
State aid therefore forms only a part of state interventions; 
according to the EU terminology, it is a narrow segment 
focusing on the interactions between the State and business 
sector with the exception of households (consumers and 
individuals). 
State aid is defined in the founding treaties as the 
primary sources of law but is regulated by secondary and 
ancillery sources and the case law of the European Court. 
With the Treaty of Lisbon (EU 2008) having entered into 
force in 2007, it is now governed by Article 107(1) on the 
Functioning of the European Union. According to this 
article, "any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in 
so far as it affects trade between Member States" normally 
be incompatible with the internal market and therefore 
prohibited as a general rule. 
The main elements of State aid (EC 2016) are the 
following: 
a) the beneficiary carries out an economic activity: any 
activity involving the supply of goods and services on 
a given market which presupposes the risk of service 
provided for it. Thus, the business is not merely a 
business with or without legal entity but any market 
player actually carrying out an economic activity in the 
internal market irrespective of its legal status. 
b) imputability and state resource: the term State includes 
both an institution established or managed or partly 
financed either by the central budget or its subsystems. 
Thus, any direct or indirect aid measure granted by the 
ministries, institutions (aid grantors) and other 
authorities belonging to the central government and 
any local government body (municipality, county, etc.) 
constitutes State aid. Moreover, measures creating a 
lack in state revenue such as tax allowances (partial or 
entire tax benefit and tax credit, too) also constitute aid 
within the meaning of the EU Competition Law. 
c) selectivity: when undertakings in the same factual and 
legal situation are not automatically eligible for 
support, the aid measure constitutes State aid because 
of its selective nature. The selectivity can be sectoral 
(e.g. covering a particular market), geographic (e.g. 
limited to a particular region) or discriminatory by 
aiming at particular market players. If undertakings in 
the same factual and legal situation are automatically 
eligible for and benefit from subsidy from an aid 
scheme and fulfil all the required (general and specific) 
conditions, it qualifies for a general measure and 
therefore does not constitute State aid. 
d) advantage at the level of the beneficiary: under the 
same market and financing conditions, the beneficiary 
will not be able to obtain advantage on the market 
compared to its competitors. 
e) impact on competition: in competing markets, 
including those which have not yet been liberalised 
(that is, closed by the state or to be opened gradually) 
but competition may arise, the aid measure is 
considered to distort or threaten to distort competition 
and therefore it qualifies as State aid. If a particular 
market had been liberalised earlier but later closed to 
market players, this also distorts or threatens to distort 
competition. 
f) effect on trade between MSs: this arises in cases when 
due to a subsidy it is likely that customers, investments 
or services are attracted from other MSs or the 
establishment of companies are obstructed from other 
MSs in the area concerned and the free movement of 
goods and services in the internal market are breached. 
The six different constituent elements of State aid are 
conjunctive, that is, all of them must be fulfiled for an aid 
measure to qualify as State aid and vice versa: if one of the 
constituent elements is not met, the aid measure does not 
constitute State aid. However, the European Commission 
(hereinafter EC) basically makes the assumption that an 
aid measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and 
trade (the supply and/or demand side).  
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Source: author’s compilation 
Figure 1. Assessment and compatibility check of aid measures 
When considering that an aid measure is State aid (see 
Figure 1) based on the six criteria, State aid rules are to be 
applied. The so-called de minimis aid (EC 2013a) is 
considered not to be State aid because of its "small" 
character (aid not exceeding EUR 200,000 per undertaking 
over any period of three fiscal years) and therefore it can 
be assumed that the competition is not distorted and trade 
is not affected but the rules are to be applied. Article 
107(2) and (3) allows that under certain circumstances 
State aid can be granted if it is for an equitable and well-
functioning economy and if it contributes to the economic 
development. The difference between Article 107(2) and 
(3) is the applicability; while in the case of the former the 
aid is automatically compatible with the internal market 
(e.g. subsidies for restoring natural disasters, social aid, 
supporting individuals, etc.), in the latter case the aid can 
only be considered compatible (e.g. to support 
employment, regional development, environmental 
protection and energy savings, culture, heritage, etc.). In 
the case of compatibility with the internal market it has to 
be assessed whether it can be block-exempted (EC 2014) 
– meaning that the aid can be granted under national 
competence – which depends on the type of aid (categories 
such as regional development or research and development 
and innovation, hereinafter RDI) and its amount, of course. 
Above a certain threshold determined in the so-called 
block-exemption regulations and in several circumstances 
State aid can only be approved individually (i.e. case by 
case) by the EC (more precisely by the Directorate-
General for Competition, hereinafter DG COMP), and the 
MS has no more control over it. When under national 
competence, in Hungary it is the State Aid Monitoring 
Office that is in charge of ensuring whether the subsidies 
granted in Hungary are in accordance with the State aid 
rules of the EU, mediating between DG COMP and the 
Hungarian aid grantors, and acting if necessary at the same 
time. The total number of the existing aid schemes was 187 
as of 31 October 2018 (i.e. aid programmes but within the 
meaning of State aid rules, notwithstanding the rules on 
Structural funds, see EC 2013b) registered with the State 
Aid Monitoring Office of Hungary and reported to DG 
COMP.  
TIMELINE OF RULES VERSUS 
FACTS & FIGURES 
Parallel to the rules on Structural funds, State aid rules 
(regulations, guidelines, etc.) normally adjust to 
programming periods, too. Between 2014 and 2020 the 
"new" rules entered into force in 2014 and the old ones 
expired, meaning that they could no longer bee applied 
(although in some cases a temporary extension was 
granted). Nevertheless, this does not mean that they remain 
unchanged during a 7-year period, except for the main 
frames; otherwise it could lead to anomalies when rules are 
applied. Some amendments included new aid categories, 
like in 2017, or the half-time supervision of regional aid 
map.  The State Aid Modernisation process (hereinafter 
SAM) was launched in 2012 (EC 2012) for the purpose to 
revise and modernise the rules applicable as of 2014.     
One of the novelties of the newly introduced General 
Block Exemption Regulation (hereinafter GBER) in 2014 
is that it has broadened the number of aid categories, for 
instance with aid to innovation clusters, for broadband and 
local infrastructures, heritage conservation, audio-visual 
works, as well as for sport and multifunctional, 
recreational infrastructures, in accordance with the main 
common policy objectives (see e.g. Europe 2020 Strategy, 
EC 2010). This was the case in 2017 when the GBER (EC 
2017a) was amended further by new aid categories (e.g. 
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inland and maritime ports, regional airports). The first 
years’ experience and expertise can be crucial for the 
planning of the next programming period, particularly 
given that the budget will be lower than the current one 
(EC 2017d).    
On the basis of data provided by the Member States an 
annual report (named Scoreboard) is published by DG 
COMP on subsidies according to their category, form 
(direct/indirect) and purpose (horizontal, sectoral). The aid 
amounts are collected at current price and with the 
exception of the euro area are converted into constant 
prices by the inflation rate of the given reference year in 
the given MS. According to the latest statistics in 2016 the 
overall spending by MSs for State aid was EUR 102.8 
billion, around 0.7% of GDP. The importance of block-
exempted grants is growing, with a relative share of 76% 
out of all aid measures, representing over 97% of the newly 
implemented measures. As far as the spending is 
concerned, a slightly increasing trend can be observed (see 
Figure 2). MSs spent on average around 46% of the total 
spending on GBER measures, an increase of more than 
10% compared to 2013. Under the GBER aid can be 
granted either for horizontal or vertical objectives of 
common interest. The former (e.g. environmental 
protection, local infrastructures, RDI, regional 
development, SMEs and risk finance, etc.) is by far the 
most important, with a relative share of over 90% as 
regards spending. With the exception of the bailout of 
financial institutions due to the financial crisis, sectoral 
aids used to be dominant until the early 2000s but not 
anymore. The reason behind the increasing use of GBER 
is the change in approach of competition policy: "big on 
big things and small on small things" and the scenario of 
"Doing Less More Efficiently", which means the intention 
of DG COMP to concentrate the resources on the 
significant cases, which have more impact to distort 
competition and affect trade, and not to bother with the 
"little" ones (EC Statement 2017c). This does not mean 
that the latter ones are not controlled and monitored 
systematically; moreover, considering the the deficiencies 
in aid schemes under national competence as revealed by 
the annual report of the European Court of Auditors in 
2011, its relevance has grown since then. 
MACROECONOMICS AND 
MICROECONOMICS OF STATE AID 
The economics of State aid is crucial when it is 
controlled. In the light of the development of the 
regulatory environment Haucap-Schwalbe (2011) laid 
down the main principles that should be taken into account 
and argued for the necessity for a more economic approach 
when State aid is assessed. 
Meiklejohn (1999) modeled the effects of State aid on 
competition by entering into and intervening in monopoly 
markets. The main feature of the monopolistic market is its 
dominance in setting the price in the market. Similarly to 
competitive markets, the monopoly maximises its profit 
where the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost 
(MR = MC), meaning that the final unit of output still 
results in the same cost and revenue gains. The difference 
is, however, that the monopoly sets its price above the 
marginal cost (P > MC = MR and the profit maximum 
max = AR > AC), that is to say, it provides lesser output 
compared to a competing business. Smith already 
recognised in 1776 the fundamental differences between 
perfectly competitive and non-competitive markets, 
including that the monopoly raises its revenue above "the 
natural rate" because it can sell its goods at a higher price 
on the market.  
 
 
Source: Report on Competition Policy 2017. p. 26. DG COMP, European Commission (DGC 2018a, 2018b) 
Figure 2. Use of General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) for State aid (SA) in the EU 
Gábor Potvorszki 
 62 
There is no doubt that the State has to intervene as a 
result of abuse of market dominance but it is quite not sure 
that by facilitating the entrance of new player(s) into the 
monopoly market the oligopolistic one would be less 
distortive to competition if the expenditure of State is 
compared to the lower price on the market (or on the 
contrary it could be effective in theory, see e.g. Collie 
2000). That is, if the effect of a lower price on the 
consumer's level is not at least as much as the State's 
expenditure it can be counterproductive and cannot 
contribute to an increase in the welfare level at the same 
time. In competitive markets, therefore, aid is more likely 
to have an effect on the costs of an enterprise and 
consumers either directly or indirectly from the aspect of 
distortion of competition and trade, i.e. how the cost 
functions and affects the output of a business, and how that 
contributes to the consumers’ utility and welfare. 
According to Friederiszick et al. (2006), State aid distorts 
competition in markets which are more competitive 
because it has a greater impact on the market due to lower 
profit margins or the volatility of market share as a result 
of competition. It is the operating aid which always distorts 
competition to a large extent compared with investment 
subsidies because it is directly aimed at financing the 
variable costs of a firm, which has an impact on its 
competitiveness and market share. Fingleton et al. (1999) 
examined the impact of State aid on the change in 
consumers’ and producers’ surplus, which have to be 
differentiated according to the incurred losses of a business 
and yields realised by a consumer.  
As regards the contemporary empirical studies, the 
international trend clearly shows the increasingly 
importance of microsimulation-based counterfactual 
impact assessments but not that of macroeconomic effects 
(eg. Busillo et al. (2010); Cerqua-Pellegrini (2011); 
Combes-van Ypersele (2012); Criscuolo et al. (2012); Le 
Den et al. (2012); Martini-Bondonio (2012); Mouqué 
(2012); Bronzini-Piselli (2014); Einiö (2014); Aristei et al. 
(2015)).       
STATE AID AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN THE 
VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES 
There is no Member State where no State aid is 
granted. Between 2004 and 2016 the total spending was 
0.52% of GDP on average, with a range between 0.2% and 
1.67%. In terms of the absolute amounts the difference is 
more spectacular, with a maximum value of 500 times 
higher (EUR 72.8 million for Lithuania, 0.22% of its GDP, 
compared to EUR 38.54 billion  for Germany, 1.32% of its 
GDP); overall the amount came to EUR 95.5 billion in 
2016.  
Looking at the four Visegrád countries (also called the 
V4), on average Hungary has the highest GDP-
proportionate State aid spending: between 2004 and 2016 
it amounted to 1.27%, as compared to 0.79% in the Czech 
Republic, 0.71% in Poland and 0.42% in Slovakia. In 
absolute terms, the average spending in Poland was EUR 
2.28 billion, followed by Hungary with a value of EUR 
1.22 billion, the Czech Republic with about EUR 1 billion 
and Slovakia with EUR 0.23 billion (DGC Scoreboard 
2017). Nevertheless, the real State aid expenditure is 
significantly higher when the subsidies to the railway 
sector (as a public service obligation for passenger 
transport including also infrastructural elements) are also 
counted. The agricultural (plus rural development, 
fisheries and aquaculture) and the other transport subsidies 
qualifying as State aid are much less relevant.  
 
 
Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 3. Real GDP growth rate in the V4 countries between 2004 and 2016 
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Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 4. State aid in percentage of GDP in the V4 countries between 2004 and 2016 
As it can be seen in Figure 3 and 4, State aid can be 
considered to be relatively independent of economic 
growth and constant over time in all of the Visegrad 
countries. The level of subsidies seems to be inflexible to 
the macroeconomic performance.  
The impact of the financial crisis spilled over the MSs 
and affected them to different degrees, including of course 
the Visegrad countries. One can assume that the level of 
State aid must have changed (i.e. increased): in 2008 the 
total expenditure on subsidies (i.e. with the provisional aid 
granted to the financial sector) obviously rose and reached 
its peak in 2009. In practice, however out of the four 
countries only in Hungary and Poland was aid approved 
for the bailout of the financial sector: in 2009 EUR 1.07 
billion and EUR 4.6 billion, respectively, for 
recapitalisations and EUR 5.4 billion and EUR 4.6 billion, 
respectively, for guarantees. In 2009 impaired assets were 
acquired by Hungary in the value of EUR 40 million and 
in 2010 for liquidity measures an additional EUR 3.9 
billion was granted in Hungary. In 2012 Poland provided 
a much more significant amount for recapitalisation (EUR 
29.3 billion) relying on a guarantee with the same value.  
The overall amount approved for bailing out the 
financial sector in the EU reached EUR 4,885 billion 
(around 35% of GDP) between 2008 and 2014. However, 
the subsidies actually paid out were much lower: in Poland 
only a tiny amount was spent and only for recapitalisation 
(EUR 3.75 million), and in Hungary it was EUR 0.214 
billion and EUR 2.5 billion for liquidity purposes. Overall, 
EUR 1,935 billion (14% of GDP) was actually spent in the 
EU, which means that the expected negative effects of the 
crisis were overestimated. For comparison in the US about 
USD 24.8–29 billion went into the financial sector. 
Interestingly, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia no aid 
was approved in the financial sector. Nevertheless, in 
Poland there is no evidence that the crisis affected the 
economic growth – there were no other MSs that could 
produce a growth rate with a positive sign in 2009.  
The temporary State aid to the financial sector (in the 
form of recapitalisations, impaired assets, guarantees, 
liquidity measures) had the aim to remedy the recession 
and to help the economy recover its pre-crisis growth path. 
In line with the Keynesian theory, the State intervened in 
the economy in order to alleviate the effects of the crisis. 
Not is the same vice versa: despite of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia relatively prospered between 2004 and 2007 
– and after 2012 all of the V4 countries – there is no sign 
that their expenditures on State aid would have decreased. 
In 2016 the level of State aid to the financial sector (both 
approved and used) is the lowest since 2008; in addition, 
there was no recapitalisation aid used for any bank. The 
European banking sector is relying less and less on 
government guarantees for liquidity support, as it is able to 
find the necessary liquidity on the market.  
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Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 5. GDP per capita (EUR, PPS) in the V4 countries between 2004 and 2016 
 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on Eurostat and Scoreboard (DGC 2017) 
Figure 6. State aid per capita (EUR, PPS) in the V4 countries between 2004 and 2016 
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Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 7. State aid by the main objectives in Czech Republic, 2009–2016 (EUR, million) 
The average income level was EUR 18,083 in the 
Visegrad countries between 2004 and 2016, while the 
average spending on State aid per capita was around EUR 
100, ranging from EUR 63 in Slovakia to EUR 143 in 
Hungary. Interestingly, the average level in the EU was 
about the same as the V4 average. The compound annual 
growth rate of State aid expenditure was relatively higher 
than that of the income level in all of the Visegrad 
countries (over 11.5%, compared to the average of 3.7%), 
meaning that all of them spent more on subsidies than their 
change in income level. The annual level of State aid and 
GDP per capita is strongly correlated (0.53 in Slovakia 
followed by Hungary with a value of 0.72, in Poland 0.77 
and 0.96 in the Czech Republic). The turning point in the 
change of State aid per capita (i.e. an increasing trend) in 
2015 (see Figure 4) can be obviously attributed to the 
beginning of the "new" programming period.    
STATE AID OVERVIEW IN THE V4 
COUNTRIES 
Out of the 15 aid categories it is regional investment 
aid that is one of the most relevant in all of the Visegrad 
countries and it preserved its dominant role as of 2009: on 
average with a relative share of 49% in Slovakia, 48% in 
the Czech Republic, 31% in Hungary and 21% in Poland, 
respectively (see Figures 5-8). The reason for this is quite 
prosaic. It is the eligibility (based on the regional aid map 
determining the maximum aid intensities), which depends 
on the relative development of a region (at NUTS2 level). 
Out of the 272 regions the number of the "a" regions 
falling under Article 107(3) is 72 (with maximum aid 
intensities of 25%, 35% and 50% of the eligible costs), 
with another 158 which qualify as "c" areas (meaning that 
regional investment aid can be granted only in the 
designated areas, usually at the level of LAU1 or LAU2, 
with maximum aid intensities varying from 10% to 35%) 
in the period of 2014–2020. There are an additional 39 
regions where no regional invesetment aid can be granted: 
with the exception of the Czech Prague and the Slovakian 
Bratislavský kraj all are situated in the "old" MSs. Apart 
from two regions (namely the Hungarian Közép-
Magyarország and the Polish Mazowieckie, which are "c" 
areas) 31 regions qualify s "a" regions out of the 35 in the 
Visegrad countries, meaning that their income level is 
under 75% of the average in the EU-27. As the 7th 
Cohesion Report (EC 2017b) reveals, this is not exactly the 
sign of convergence process, meaning that the sources 
proved to be allocated in not the most efficient and 
effective way.    
Regional aid is an important instrument in the EU's 
toolbox to promote greater economic and social cohesion. 
The main aim of regional investment aid is to promote 
investment projects in the relatively underdeveloped 
regions. It has an important role when attracting investors, 
especially foreign direct investments (large enterprises 
such as Audi, Mercedes or the "newcomer" BMW in 
Hungary) financed usually from the central budget or from 
EU funds when an SME invests. In principle this type of 
aid can be given for initial investments, whether greenfield 
or brownfield it covers the following activities: 
 the setting up of a new establishment,  
 the extension of the capacity of an existing one,  
 the diversification of the output of an establishment 
into products not previously produced, 
 a fundamental change in the overall production process 
of an existing establishment, 
 the acquisition of assets belonging to an establishment 
that has closed or would have closed had it not been 
purchased and is bought by an investor unrelated to the 
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seller and excludes sole acquisition of the shares of an 
undertaking, as laid down in the GBER.  
It is typical that when an investor decides to realise an 
investment project that qualifies as an initial investment, it 
claims for regional aid and other types of aid, usually for 
employment and training, and also for RDI if it is planning 
in the long run. In such a case the different types of aid do 
not have to be cumulated unless they cover the same or 
similar eligible costs, or when a project is artificially split 
into two or more subprojects that are mutually linked to 
each other, the aid cumulation rules have to be applied.       
Besides the increasing trend in State aid expenditure in 
the V4 countries, the growing importance of 
environmental protection and energy saving measures (e.g. 
subsidies for the usage of renewable energy sources, 
energy efficiency projects, etc) can be observed both in the 
Czech Republic and Poland (see Figure 5 and 7). 
Meanwhile, cultural funding tended to increase in Hungary 
and Slovakia from 2014 (see Figure 6 and 8). Subsidies for 
employment are also significant in Hungary and Poland, 
whereas funding for RDI is noticeable in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. Nevertheless, the overall EU 
spending structure clearly indicates an increasing trend in 
the energy sector (compared to 2013 it has risen more than 
3.7 times to EUR 55.9 billion in 2016) and a decrease in 
regional development (almost halved to EUR 7.3 billion). 
The other aid categories such as heritage conservation, 
promotion of exports and internationalisation and rescue 
& restructure or closure are less significant. It is also has 
to be mentioned that there is no available data about the 
aid categories introduced in 2017 such as investment aid 
for local, broadband or sport and multifunctional 
recreational infrastructure, etc. .  
 
 
Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 8. State aid by the main objectives in Hungary between 2009 and 2016 (EUR, million) 
 
Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 9. State aid by the main objectives in Poland between 2009 and 2016 (EUR, million) 
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Source: author’s compilation based on Eurostat 
Figure 10. State aid by the main objectives in Slovakia between 2009 and 2016 (EUR, million) 
As regards the forms of aid, the most typical is 
absolutely the cash grant in the Visegrad countries, with a 
share of over 70% among the aid instruments on average 
(it is relatively less frequent only in Slovakia, with 62%) 
followed by tax benefits (deferral, reduction or even 
exemption) with a share of around 20%. The other forms 
of aid (equity participation, guarantee, soft loan) are less 
significant. The dominance of cash grants and tax benefits 
in the Visegrad countries is not unique – it fits the 
European trend with similar proportions. The main reason 
for this is that the aid element of a soft loan is relatively 
much lower as a result of the difference between the 
market interest rate and the subsidised rate one (around 
several percentage points depending on the prevailing 
interest rate environment). This is the case when equity is 
granted (e.g. a subordinated debt or a capital injection) 
which has to be recovered. Guarantess are less used in 
reality (i.e. rarely claimed), as well as tax benefits, because 
of the eligibilty criteria to be met: in Hungary the 
development tax benefit can be used from the first tax year 
after the completion of an investment and only up to 
certain amount (up to 80% of the net sales).  
CONCLUSIONS 
The EU rules on competition law basically determine 
the level playing field of a Member State, i.e. what shall be 
done or may not be done. State aid is not equal to a subsidy, 
as it forms only a type of it which is defined as being 
explicitly harmful for the competition. The rules on State 
aid are adjusted to those of the Structural funds covering 
the seven-year programming period. Therefore the lessons 
learned from the current programming period is very 
relevant in considering how to plan the next one between 
2021 and 2027 in order to allocate the subsidies in a 
"better", namely more efficient and effective way. The 
preparatory work has already started, with the revision of 
rules and of course negotiations on the budget. 
The main aim of this article was to familiarize readers 
with the very specific nature of State aid within the 
meaning of EU competition law on the one hand and on 
the other hand to give some contributions about the 
similarities and differences in the Visegrad countries as 
regards the type of and spending on subsidies at 
macroeconomic level between 2009 and 2016. The V4 
countries have gradually increased their State aid spending 
since joining the EU. Moreover, the growth in their State 
aid spending was relatively higher than their increase in 
GDP per capita. The most significant aid is regional 
investment, which on the one hand is an important "tool" 
in the lagging behind regions but on the other hand makes 
their economic convergence to relatively developed ones 
rather questionable. Pisár et al. (2013) examined the 
deadweight of regional funds in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and concluded that around 35% of subsidies can 
be regarded ineffective meaning that a significant part of 
the regional investments would have been carried out 
without grants. Owczarczuk (2013) draws the attention to 
the importance of R&D subsidies in the Visegrad countries 
and to the fact that the efforts by the governments are not 
sufficient in order to facilitate the inflow of foreign direct 
investments into the R&D sector. However, to raise the – 
non-governmental – R&D activity in the V4 in the long 
run is a crucial factor in terms of competitiveness.        
Nevertheless, the level of State aid (as a percentage in 
GDP) seems to have no relation to the economic growth 
(Figure 3). However, this is not only characteristic of the 
Visegrad countries but of the EU as a whole.   
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